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One of the ways to describe human beings is to say 
that they are «persons». It is assumed that important 
implications for educational discourse can be drawn 
from the concept of human beings as «persons». This 
becomes obvious in a general way when we ask what 
the result of denying that human beings are persons 
would be. The concept can be regarded as a categori­
cal one when we use it to refer to what human beings 
fundamentally are. However, we are going to explore 
two other important conceptual areas where the no­
tion of the person is thought to be relevant to educa­
tion. The ethical principle of «respect for persons» 
proves significant for governing the teacher’s re­
lationship with the children he teaches (pupils). 
Equal regard will be paid to the claim that education 
should be considered, basically, with the «devel­
opment of persons».
It has been suggested by L. A. Reid, in his book 
Philosophy and Education, that «‘persons’ can mean 
nearly anything and almost nothing», and such a 
statement draws our attention to the philosophical 
problems of meaning and justification, as well as to 
the difficulties involved in analysing such a general 
term, which should be overcome before we examine 
the relations between the concept of «person» and 
education.1 The difficulties arise from the multiple 
ways of using the word «person».
The root meanings of «person» reside in the words 
«persona» (Roman) and «πρόσωπο» (Greek). In 
both cases «they are used to refer to people as not 
just biological individuals».2 They refer to the mask, 
or image, which a man presents to the world, and also 
to the real person who speaks through the mask.
«In its legal use, it stands particularly for the notion of someone 
being a subject to rights, including a corporate body.»3
These meanings develop into terms referring to the 
moral and social significance of human beings, hence 
the present-day view of person as «an assemblage of 
roles».4 It becomes clear that there can’t be a definite 
answer to the question of the fundamental nature of 
human beings, for there is more than one correct way 
in which to use the word. Its meaningful use is limited 
by the different assumptions and beliefs on which the 
various senses of the word «person» are based.
In Beyond Freedom and Dignity, B. F. Skinner of­
fers an explanation of human nature fashioned ac­
cording to empirical and scientific methods. He 
draws general conclusions from observed phenomena 
based on the underlying assumptions that human be-
1. L. A. Reid, Philosophy and Education: An Introduction 
(London, 1962), p. 63.
2. Dorothy Emmet, Rules, Roles and Relations (London, 1966), 
p. 177.
3. Emmet, p. 176.
4. Ibid., p. 172.
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haviour is subject to the same laws of cause and effect 
which govern the physical world. He asserts
«that it is the environment which acts upon the perceiving person, 
not the perceiving person who acts upon the environment».5
Human behavior is regarded as the result of re­
sponses to the forces of reward and punishment. In 
behaviouristic terms: we pursue and value as good 
that which reinforces us, and we call bad and avoid 
what negatively reinforces us.
«Α scientific analysis of behaviour dispossesses autonomous man 
and turns the control he has been said to exert over to the 
environment.»6
The familiar usage of the term «person» makes it 
synonymous with «man», or «human being», and 
brings to mind a concrete image of a human being. 
The empirical concept of the «person» applies to the 
readily recognizable, ordinary appearance and pres­
ence of a living human body. However, we can substi­
tute human being for person without a loss of mean­
ing, only if we concede that human beings are by 
nature purposive and assertive. Then we could ex­
plain human behaviour in terms of reasons for action 
and not in terms of determining antecedent causes. 
To force the model of scientific explanation on 
human behaviour, and as a result to hold that human 
behaviour is merely a response to contingent nega­
tive and positive reinforcement is to deny that human 
beings are persons in any meaningful sense of the 
word.
In the process of examining the usages of the word 
that distinguish it from the concept of existent human 
being we will need to refer to the ideas and views of 
philosophers.
Through the process of deductive reasoning, Des­
cartes arrived at the belief: «I think therefore I am». 
The essential characteristic of human being and the 
necessary condition for his existence as a person was 
consciousness, or self-consciousness. Descartes put 
it:
« Ί am’ precisely taken refers only to a conscious being; that is a 
mind, a soul (animus), an intellect, and reason—words whose 
meaning I did not previously know. I am a real being, and really 
exist, but what sort of being? As I said, a conscious being 
(cogi tans).»7
Identity of the body is distinct from «personal» iden­
tity. The usual, common way of discriminating be­
5. B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (London, 1971), 
p. 184.
6. Skinner, p. 200.
7. Elizabeth Anscombe, and Peter Thomas, Descartes:
Philosophical Writings (London, 1954), p. 69.
Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure 
Reason’ (London. 1930), pp. 460-462.
tween one person and another is by means of the 
characteristic features of their bodies. However, if 
the person is conceived of as a spirit possessing only a 
point of view on the world, how are we to differen­
tiate one spirit from another? The emptiness of the 
Cartesian concept offers ground for the Kantian as­
sertion that there are a number of selves residing in a 
particular body at a particular time. And this is the 
result of equating an immaterial substance, the owner 
of mental states and the body, with the person. 
Hume, moreover, was unable to explain how the 
mind could unite experience without there being a 
subject of awareness as the means unification. He 
said:
«when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always 
stumble on some particular perception or other... I never catch 
myself at any time without a perception, and can never observe 
anything but the perception.»8
Descartes’ attempt to identify the concept of the 
«person» with a mental sub-stratum, and Hume’s 
counter-assertion that such an entity cannot be dis­
covered in experience, may both be rejected, for they 
refer to a passively observing mind receiving impres­
sions and sensations from the outside. The empirical 
concept of a subject of experience refers to bodies 
which are capable of having impressions and sensa­
tions.
P. F. Strawson attempts to resolve the mind-body 
problem and uses two kinds of predicates to describe 
persons: the M-predicates, which can be applied both 
to persons and material objects, imply the possession 
of a physical body and serve as the only means of 
identification; the P-predicates can be meaningfully 
applied to persons, and they imply the possession of 
consciousness. To the question of how we are able to 
ascribe states of consciousness to ourselves he an­
swers that
«One can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself only if one can 
ascribe them to others. One can ascribe them to others only if one 
can identify other subjects of experience. And one cannot identify 
others if one can identify them only as subjects of experience, 
possessors of state of consciousness».9
Strawson argues that both the mental and the physi­
cal are attributes of persons; the «person» in the un­
derlying entity to which both mental and physical 
states are ascribed. Hence, the concept of the 
«person» is «logically primitive», which
«is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing 
states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal charac-
8. P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (London, 1966), p. 169.
9. Strawson, Individuals (London, 1959), p. 100.
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teristics, a physical situation, as equally applicable to a single indi­
vidual of that single type».10
Through the process of social learning we acquire a 
conceptual scheme which enables us to ascribe 
P-predicates both to ourselves and to others. Our 
knowledge of ourselves comes from the consciousness 
of our own mental states, but that of others comes 
from their behaviour and especially their language, 
which becomes the main source of our information 
about them. Language enables us to ascribe 
M-predicates and P-predicates to persons who are 
necessarily bodies, centres of consciousness, can 
think, or can reason and who have sensations.
The concept of the self arrived at by Wittgenstein is 
not an immaterial substance, empirically unidentifi­
able, but transcendental, the basis and the limit of all 
experience at the same time. The «metaphysical self» 
is the necessary precondition of the existence of an 
intelligible world. It is the limit of the world since what 
could not be known by the self would not be part of the 
self.
5.62 The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits 
of language(of that language which alone I understand) mean 
the limits of my world.11
5.631 am my world (the microcosm).
5.631 There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains 
ideas.
5.632 The subject does not belong to theworld: rather,it is a limit of 
the world.
5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found? 
5.641 Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about
the self in a non-psychological way.
What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that «the world 
is my world».
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human 
body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but 
rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world—not a 
part of it.12
Although the possession of a body is considered to 
be a necessary requirement for the application of the 
notion of the person, there’s no specific requirement 
that it be of the human variety. Locke brought out the 
distinction between «human being» and «person». He 
suggested that a parrot that could be heard to 
«discourse, reason, and philosophise» could be 
thought of as a person but definitely not as a man- 
human being. For Locke, person
«stands for a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflec­
tion and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in 
different times and places, which it does only by that consciousness 
which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential 
to it».13
10. Ibid., p. 102.
11. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico - Philosophicus 
(London, 1961), p. 115.
12. Wittgenstein, pp. 117-8.
13. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
(London, 1964), p. 211.
There is need to distinguish persons from machines 
and from animals. With the great advancement in 
cybernetics and the progress in the construction of 
computers and generally of thinking machines, we 
may find it difficult in the future to deny that 
machines, namely, robots, are persons. We already 
attribute P-predicates to machines simulating the 
human mind. In the discussion of whether mechanical 
robots should be conceived of having feelings, or not, 
Ronald Puccetti argues that
«even the most idealised humanoid machine, if it is really a 
machine, cannot qualify as a person. What really cuts a machine off 
from the community of persons is not, therefore, a necessary lack of 
consciousness, but a highly probable lack of feeling».14
Scriven, however, asserts that if a robot is program­
med with the language of feelings it should be re­
garded as having feelings.15 Persons as embodied 
minds can be thought of as having thoughts and ex­
periencing sensations, but Locke’s formal use of the 
concept distinguishes persons from animals on the 
basis that the former can reason and talk, whereas the 
latter can not. Although, human persons belong to an 
animal species, they can be distinguished from animals 
by their «rationality», the use of language, and their 
ability to enter, or not, into personal relationships.
Jonathan Bennett, in Rationality, argues that the 
capacity humans have to follow rules or give reasons 
for their behaviour presupposes ability to relate not 
only what is present but also what is past by means of 
universal judgements. He claims that
«the expression of dated and universal judgements is both necessary 
and sufficient for rationality, and thus that linguistic capacity is 
necessary but not sufficient for rationality».16
The ability to theorise and reminisce facilitated by 
the use of sophisticated language enable the human 
person to elaborate very complex conceptual 
schemes. This idea of rationality agrees with Locke’s 
concept of the «person», especially when we refer to 
the important functions Locke took the concept to 
have. «Person» was for him a «forensic» term only to 
be applied «to intelligent agents, capable of a law, 
and happiness and misery».17 Only those beings who 
can remember past actions, who are aware of a con­
tinuing self and rationally plan future actions, can be 
held responsible in law for their actions. The forensic 
use of the term implies an important distinction 
within the category of human beings: between those
14. Ronald Puccetti. Persons: A Study of Possible MoraI Agents 
in the Universe (London, 1968), p. 49.
15. Puccetti, p. 29, p. 55.
16. Jonathan Bennett, Rationality (London, 1964), p. 94.
17. John Locke, p. 220.
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who can and those who cannot be held responsible, 
or partially so (e.g. the insane, and young children).
The notion of moral agency must be mentioned. A 
person in the possession of a body and a conceptual 
scheme can experience emotions and this capacity is 
characteristic of moral relationships. Having feelings 
and experiencing emotions due to the possession of a 
body, enables one to understand what it is to have 
similar feelings and emotions. Puccetti, thus, refers to 
a «person» as a «moral being».18 The human person 
is a moral agent at the same time both moral object 
and subject.
«The proper application of ‘moral’ predicates to an entity is the 
sine qua non of correctly designating that entity a ‘person’.»19
The specific world-view associated with the con­
cept of person may have different consequences for 
human behaviour. The empirical scientific explana­
tion of causally determined behaviour comes as a 
threat to the forensic concept, for the predictive 
power of science may have serious implications for 
man’s legal accountability and accordingly for the 
whole concept of moral responsibility.
The distinction between behaviour in accordance 
with a rule and behaviour which follows a rule should 
be made if we are to understand the nature of a 
human agent acting in an intentional manner, for­
mulating rules to guide action in the future. The dis­
tinctively human actions can be understood only in 
terms of reasons rather than in terms of antecedent 
causal effect. To follow rules means that the rule- 
follower will be able to supply a reason for what he 
does. To be a responsible moral agent it is necessary 
to be initiated into the distinctive concepts and rules 
which constitute morality and which give meaning to 
moral actions. A child cannot be held responsible 
until he has learned to understand what stealing, 
lying etc. mean.
The forensic concept of the person makes sense 
only if we refer to human action in terms of reasons 
and purposes. The possibility of making decisions of 
social significance is crucial for the ascription of 
moral responsibility and is presupposed in the use of 
moral concepts if they are to have any meaning. But 
if, as Skinner believes, human behaviour is caused, 
then blame should not be attached to actions for 
which men are not responsible. Punishment in the 
form of referring back to what someone has done 
would, therefore, lose its meaning, and the main task, 
Skinner suggests, should be to organise men’s be­
haviour in a socially desirable direction. He suggests 
that, once we have done away with autonomous man
18. Puccetti, p. 13.
19. Ibid., p. 12.
and the notions of freedom, choice, and moral re­
sponsibility, we can produce people who are invari­
ably good. The forensic term becomes meaningful as 
a part of the world-view in which man is regarded as 
free, rational, capable of purposive activity. The 
growth of consciousness of oneself as an individual 
person with rights and duties belonging to oneself as 
a result of merely being a person, is a relatively late 
social phenomenon.
With the growth of self-consciousness when one’s 
role is no longer considered as the only determinant 
of one’s duties and purposes in life, the specification 
of educational aims becomes problematic in the same 
way as the justification of moral, or evaluative 
judgements. In education the problem arises as to 
how a person ought to be educated rather than set­
ting prescribing norms for training in the perfor­
mance of particular roles. It becomes plausible to 
state as an educational ideal what Rousseau presents 
in Emile:
«Before his parents chose a calling for him nature called him to be 
a man. Life is the trade I would teach him. When he leaves me, I 
grant you, he will be neither a magistrate, a soldier, nor a priest; he 
will be a man.»20
The principle of respect for persons and the notion 
of the development of persons are the areas where 
the concepts of education and the person seem to be 
significantly related. In both cases, since the term 
«person» carries normative overtones and is, there­
fore, value laden, it is used for making evaluative 
conclusions. 21
G. J. Warnock believes that «the essence of moral­
ity is ‘respect for persons’, and perhaps also in the 
idea that there are ‘natural’ rights, independent of 
status or any special claims».22 The fundamental na­
ture of the ethical principle of respect for persons is 
to be taken at least in its prescription of limiting con­
ditions on how we ought to treat other human beings. 
The limitations, which respect for persons places on 
our purposes is that, if they are to be moral, they 
should never involve the use of other persons solely 
as instruments to achieve our ends. As Kantbelieved:
«Rational beings... are called «persons» because their nature al­
ready marks them out as ends in themselves—that is as something 
which ought not to be used merely as a means —and consequently 
imposes to that extent a limit on all arbitrary treatment of them» ;23
and at another instance he asserts:
20. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile (London, 1911), p. 9.
21. P. H. Hirst, and R. S. Peters, The Logic of Education 
(London. 1970). p. 58.
22. G. J. Warnock, The Object of Morality (London. 1971), 
p. 150.
23. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals 
(New York, 1964), p. 96.
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«... reverence is regarded as the ‘effect' of the law on the subject 
and not as the 'cause of the law». «All reverence for a person is 
properly only reverence for the law (of honesty and so on) of 
which that person only gives us an example».24
R. M. Hare considers the basic principle of morality 
to be that whatever rule a person applies to others he 
must be willing to apply to himself. There’s a nega­
tive and a positive aspect to the meaning of respect 
for persons. It is negative because to respect another 
human being involves the avoidance of arbitrary in­
terference, and indignity. In a positive sense respect 
for persons suggests the active seeking of happiness 
for others. A justification of the principle of respect 
for persons lies in it being a necessary presupposition 
of a «moral» form of life which takes seriously what it 
is to be a person.
Kant’s idea is taken up and reconstructed by R. S. 
Peters. The agent or person is viewed as forming 
judgements, acting according to beliefs, and exerting 
regulation upon his participation in personal re­
lationships. For Peters, the concept of «person» is 
normative and is characterised by
«the fact that consciousness is individuated into distinct centres, 
linked with distinct physical bodies and with distinctive points of 
view».25
However, this conception of person is meaningful 
only when the above characteristics are «taken to be 
a matter of importance in a society», where the indi­
vidual is allowed to participate in a variety of social 
contexts, and is treated with respect.26 Isaiah Berlin 
in his Four Essays on Liberty gives a long account of 
what is taken to be free to do things, and what liberty 
consists of.
«The ‘positive’ sense of the word ‘liberty’ derives from the wish 
on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life 
and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of what­
ever kind.» «I wish to be a subject, not an object»; «I wish above 
all to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, 
bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by 
references to my own ideas and purposes.»27
If it is granted that children are persons, or poten­
tially persons, then the principle that they are owed 
respect is of obvious relevance for the teachers in the 
teaching situation. The concept is both an ethical 
principle prescribing modes of actions and an ethical 
attitude influencing one’s outlook for other people. 
How does the principle of respect for persons apply 
to educational situations?
It is generally accepted that children have rights 
which should be recognised. To deny that children
24. Kant, p. 69.
25. R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education (London, 1966), p. 211.
26. Peters, p. 211.
27. Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (London, 1969),
p. 131.
are persons as part of the argument that human be­
haviour is causally determined is to reject the concept 
of moral responsibility and moral agency. However, 
we claimed that these are essential if sense is to be 
made of what we ordinarily understand by human 
experience. There is another difficulty to deal with, 
namely the different ideas about what constitutes re­
spect in specific educational contexts.
H. J. Eysenck in the article «The Place of Indoctri­
nation in a World of Rationalists» argues in favour of 
the causal account of human behaviour, and indicates 
consequences for education. In his words:
«Human conduct is essentially determined by irrational forces 
such as the hedonistic laws of reinforcement; reason has its main, if 
not, its only function in serving to facilitate the fulfilment of desires 
and needs which it can only recognise but not control».28
Human behaviour is to be explained in terms of 
punishment and reward. The task of parents and 
teachers, he concludes, is to indoctrinate the young 
into the set of values they support. In Eysenck’s ar­
gument there can be no rational basis for the values 
into which the young are initiated. Indoctrination is 
morally objectionable. The indoctrinated man will 
have a closed mind and accept uncritically the doc­
trines he has been brought up not to question. 29 To 
indoctrinate is a case of showing disrespect to a per­
son; and indoctrination is normally contrasted to 
forms of teaching which claim to enable the indi­
vidual to make decisions based on a rational ap­
praisal of all the relevant issues.
When we punish a child do we show lack of respect 
to him as a person? As in the cases of indoctrination 
the answer depends on what the «person» is taken to 
be. Some people claim that it is when a person is 
punished for wrong doing that respect is shown to 
him as a person, for, then, he is regarded as a rational 
agent capable of choice and able to suffer the conse­
quences. To abolish punishment would imply that 
men are not able to choose. However, why should 
punishment be maintained since it is often ineffectual 
and indeed counter-productive? A possible outcome 
of punishing a child in school might be to alienate 
him from all that school stands for. If a child is 
punished, in view of the fact that it is not going to do 
him any good but only to serve as a lesson to others, 
then this would be a case of treating a person as a 
means and not as an end; hence, a case of lack of 
respect. The case put forward by some 
educationalists is that the only reasonable use of 
punishment in schools, or elsewhere, which doesn’t 
imply lack of respect for children as persons is in the
28. H. J. Eysenck, «The Place of Indoctrination in a World of 
Rationalists», The Rationalist Annual (London, 1967), p. 9.
29. T. H. B. Hollins, Aims in Education: The Philosophic Ap­
proach, John Wilson, «Education and Indoctrination», pp. 24-46.
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intention of reform. Views of punishment for reform 
and punishment as retribution, although at odds with 
each other are allowed to be held in the educational 
context. It is true that children can learn to hate 
school, because they associate it with the threat of 
punishment; so one should consider psychological 
and sociological factors connected with the child’s 
background in deciding how to deal with disobedient 
children. Nevertheless, punishment can be a means 
through which a child will learn what it is to be a 
member of a moral community and what member­
ship of this community requires of its members. It is 
in this sense that he is being respected and honoured 
as a rational being.
We should now examine the real status of children 
as persons, for the notion of the inevitable immatur­
ity of children has important effect, on the question 
of what ought to be taught and the question of how it 
should be taught. Forensically speaking, children 
below a certain age are not persons; they are not 
regarded as moral agents and moral actions are not 
imputed to them. A child is considered impulsive and 
as having not developed a pattern of rule-following 
for his goals. Following Kant, Piaget explains the 
moral development of children in terms of two con­
cepts: autonomy and heteronomy. For a child to be 
autonomous it would be necessary for him to under­
stand the rules he obeys and how they rest on 
reasons. It would also be necessary for him to abide 
consistently by these rules in practice. Since the child 
is thought to be deficient on both these grounds, he is 
most likely to be guided by the commands and sanc­
tions of parents and others rather than by his own 
efforts and choices. The child’s relation to rules in 
such a case is called by Piaget: «heteronymous». Al­
though children are not «autonomous» persons they 
are still persons, hence bearers of rights. As A. I. 
Melden writes in his book Free Action,
«How except in human terms can a human being be understood? 
— Still, a child acts and so does an adult, so there must be some­
thing in common; and what they have in common is, surely, that 
both act, both are persons. »!0
The argument that children should be respected as 
persons is related to the general demand for democ­
racy in schools, and for more freedom for the child in 
education. «Child-centred» progressive theories of 
education can be conceived as attempts to highlight 
the notion that children are persons. Many practical 
benefits can be gained from introducing democracy, 
more freedom and adopting a child-centred ap­
proach. The progressives argue against au­
thoritarianism and claim that if children are not 
treated as persons they are less likely to develop as 30
30. A. I. Melden, Free Action (London, 1961), p. 198.
persons. The progressive demand that education 
should be centred on the child has consequences for 
how the child should be taught which will in turn 
have an effect on the content of what is taught.
Beside the instrumental value of democratic par­
ticipation in important decisions, the principle of re­
spect for persons demands that schools should be run 
democratically. Democracy could possibly be defined 
in terms of the principle of respect for persons whose 
origin lies in the notion of a person as a free, self- 
determining, moral agent capable of shaping his own 
life, i.e. able to develop an assertive viewpoint. Any 
restriction on a person’s freedom must necessarily 
involve the subjection of one man’s interests and 
purposes to the interests and purposes of another and 
this runs against the belief that persons should be 
treated as ends in themselves. John Stuart Mill argues 
against coercion of the individual even when coercion 
is regarded to be in the individual’s own interests. 
Hence
«In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of 
right, absolute.» «Over himself, over his own body and mind, the 
individual is sovereign».31
In Interest and Discipline in Education,P. S. Wilson 
defends the child-centred approach to education on 
the grounds that in teaching one should start from the 
interests of the child, for otherwise there is the 
danger that the child’s mind will be prevented from 
developing; the assumption is that growth can come 
only from the existing interests. A teacher-centred 
method will lead to the closing of a child’s mind since 
what the teacher is interested in is not necessarily 
what the child is interested in.32 An opposite view to 
Wilson’s is to be found in R. S. Peters’ concept of an 
«educated man». He specifies what the end state of 
the process of education should encompass. There 
are many things a child must learn at school, which he 
is not particularly interested in and can barely under­
stand, but which once taught to him will enable new 
interests and greater understanding to develop. The 
principle of respect for persons may justify both a 
compulsory curriculum and also the child-centred 
views. A lot depends on the particular standpoint we 
adopt towards the concept of the child as a person. If 
childhood is seen as the time when the capacities for 
future development as a person grow, the obligation 
to help the child acquire knowledge and èxperience 
seems strong. Thus, helping the child is to show re­
spect to him as a person. In the process of moral 
education a child has to acquire habits and concepts 
he may not fully understand at the time. If the even-
31. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative 
Government (London, 1972), p.73.
32. P. S. Wilson, Interest and Discipline in Education (London, 
1971), p. 88-89.
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tual aim is to enable the child to practice the habits he 
acquires in a discriminating fashion then there is no 
indoctrination and, therefore, no disrespect for per­
sons. A child must submit to the discipline of teach­
ing, because it is improbable that its mind can de­
velop to any great extent solely out of his own un­
aided resources. There is the point that if children are 
always treated as children they will never grow up to 
be the mature responsible educated adults. However, 
it is equally mistaken to treat children as if they were 
adults before they acquire the knowledge and skills 
necessary to adulthood.
Examples in recent history indicated that it is fairly 
easy for people to treat other human beings as if they 
did not exist as persons. The Nazi extermination 
camps are an example, and forms of racial discrimi­
nation can be looked at as denying human beings 
their full dignity as persons. Especially in America 
the total lack of recognition that Negro children are 
persons gave rise to a number of forms of arbitrary 
discriminations in the area of education. They are 
still considered as «things» whose moral demands 
may be ignored. In the cases of indoctrination, pater­
nalism, punishment, and coercion, persons at least 
were respected in that they were thought valuable 
enough to be manipulated and conditioned. Respect 
for a person in whatever context demands an under­
standing of him as an individual with a distinctive 
world-view, and set of values. Only in this way shall 
we know how to help and encourage him, and what 
to guard against in our own attitudes and actions to­
wards him. The demand is from underprivileged 
groups of people that there should be a minimum 
degree of equality in consideration for all human be­
ings, regardless of the label which contingent genetic, 
or social circumstances might have given them. Peo­
ple should not be denied the opportunities to develop 
their talents because they happen to have a coloured 
skin, or belong to a certain socioeconomic class. 
Moreover, equality of opportunity is not enough; it 
must be ensured that children have equal opportunity 
to use their intelligence as well as to acquire intelli­
gence, since it is meaningless for opportunities to be 
offered when the necessary intelligence to take ad­
vantage of them does not exist.
We shall now look into the relationship between 
the concept of the «person» and educational aims. 
The surest guide as to how men ought to be educated 
might be in the notion of what they essentially are. 
Glenn Langford in Philosophy and Education ex­
presses the view that «to become educated,... is to be 
successful in learning to become a person».33 In his 
1970 revised paper entitled «Education and the Edu­
33. Glenn Langford, Philosophy and Education: An Introduc­
tion (London, 1968), p. 60.
cated Man», Peters presents two contemporary con­
cepts of «education»: the first, preserves an earlier 
notion of upbringing, or rearing, or instructing; the 
second, gains meaning through its connection with 
the notion of the «educated man». Important is the 
emergence of an ideal centering around the de­
velopment of persons, which essentially became con­
stitutive of a more sophisticated idea of education. 
Peters states:
«the notion of 'educated' as characterising the all-round develop­
ment of a person morally, intellectually and spiritually emerged 
only in the nineteenth century», «...though before the nineteenth 
century there had been the ideal of the cultivated person who was 
the product of elaborate training and instruction, the term ‘an 
educated man’ was not the usual one for drawing attention to this 
ideal». «Nowadays, especially in educational circles, the concept of 
an educated man as an ideal has very much taken root.» «...those 
working in educational institutions... have become very sensitive to 
the difference between working with this ideal in mind and having 
limited and specific goals, for which they use the word ‘training’».34
The suggestion is of an historical transition in the 
nature of an ideal from that of a «cultivated man», 
interpreted in a very general way, to that of an 
«educated man», which incorporates (a) the idea of a 
development to which knowledge and understanding 
made a significant contribution; (b) an emphasis on 
the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, for the 
educated man is not restricted to an instrumental 
kind of understanding; and (c) the notion of the all­
round development of persons.35 When education is 
discussed in terms of an ideal, and where it is linked 
with human development, the inbuilt notion of an 
ethical requirement is inescapable. It is obvious that 
some normative idea enters into the processes 
thought to operate for the betterment of those con­
cerned.Thus Peters in Ethics and Education express­
es that
«given that 'education' suggests the instrumental bringing about of 
a desirable state of mind in a morally unobjectionable manner, it is 
only too easy to conceive of education as a mental process that is 
instrumental to something that is worthwhile which is intrinsic to 
it».36
Talking about the relationship between an ideal and 
an aim or a set of aims, Peters in his 1970 paper says 
that
«any statement about an aim or about x’s aim of education, em­
phasises features of a person that are part of the understanding of 
what it means for him to be 'educated'. Of anything that we can call 
an aim of education we can also say So that’s what you take an 
educated person to be like'»?’’
34. R. S. Peters, «Education and Educated Man », Education and 
the Development of Reason, pp.9-10.
35. Peters, pp. 3-11.
36. Peters, Ethics and Education (London, 1966), p. 27.
37. Peters, «Education and the Educated Man», p. 15.
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Dewey in Democracy and Education defines educa­
tion as
«...that reconstruction or reorganisation of experience which adds 
to the meaning of experience and which increases ability to direct 
the course of subsequent experience».38
and the concept of development in educational terms 
means
«(i) that the educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its 
own end; and that (ii) the educational process is one continual 
reorganising, reconstructing, transforming».39
The idea of learning is understood as becoming and 
not as acquisition; «education» is to be understood as 
concerned with bringing about a cognitive transforma­
tion as a contribution to the all-round development of 
a person.
The concept of the person for which we have been 
arguing all through this paper and its connection with 
education becomes more obvious in the form of edu­
cation called «liberal education». P. H. Hirst claims 
that the origin of the notion of liberal education is a 
Greek ideal and dates back to Plato and Aristotle. 
Moreover, he says that
«whatever else a liberal education is, it is not a vocational education, 
not an exclusively scientific education, or not a specialist education 
in any sense».40
The value of liberal education is not its instrumental­
ity, but its intrinsic value for the pursuit of knowledge 
as the essential good for man. It is, as Socrates would 
say, better for a rational agent to know, than to remain 
ignorant. A liberal education was regarded «as freeing 
the mind to function according to its true nature, 
freeing reason from error and illusion and freeing 
man’s conduct from wrong».41 The chief characteris­
tic is that it is comprehensive, i.e. it is concerned with 
«the range of knowledge as a whole», and the initia­
tion into various forms of knowledge familiar to 
human experience.42 The notion of liberal education 
also implies the education of the «whole man», for it 
refers to the development not only of understanding 
but also of aesthetic judgements and moral awareness. 
It can also be understood in terms of the Socratic ideal 
of the search for «the good»—the attempt to discover 
and to act according to the standards of excellence and 
truth—which becomes the principle of unity and di­
rection for one’s life.
38. John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York, 1944), 
p. 76.
39. Dewev p. 50.
40. R. H. Hirst. «Liberal Education and the Nature of 
Knowledge» in Education and the Development of Reason, p. 391.
41. Hirst, p. 393.
42. Ibid, p. 408.
It is needless to stress that liberal education frees 
the individual from anything that could prevent him 
from developing «as a person». It is not claimed here 
that human beings who have not had a liberal educa­
tion with an emphasis on «personal development» are 
not persons. The relevance of liberal education lies in 
the implicit assumption of rationality and enlarged 
awareness guiding personal development, self- 
directedness, and self-control. The ideal of «personal 
autonomy», as Dearden puts it, suggests a growth in 
self-awareness as a critical agent.43
It must be made clear that the scope of liberal 
education is neither limited to a specific number of 
academic subjects, nor incompatible with the acquisi­
tion of professional skills. If vocational education is 
made to be more than training and designed to pro­
mote feelings of worthwhileness in individuals it con­
tributes to their development as persons. However, the 
pressure for specialisation as a result of the rapid 
expansion of knowledge justified on utilitarian and 
functional grounds is a threat to the concepts of liberal 
education and the rational agent. Utilitarianism as an 
educational phenomenon is to be found in the value of 
education as a means to a useful end. The criterion of 
usefulness is a dominant guideline for educational 
systems in preparing individuals for the function they 
are to perform in society. Some branches of knowl­
edge (e.g. science and mathematics) provide more 
material benefits than others; therefore, specialisa­
tion in these is justified in terms of their utility. J. S. 
Mills stated the principle of utility to be
«that happiness is desirable..., as an end; all other things being only 
desirable as means to that end»;
and that
«the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable 
is that people do actually desire it».44
However, the problem arises as to the extremes to 
which utilitarianism can lead, for on what grounds 
should some desires be preferred to others? We are 
ready to object to the immoral use of control over 
human persons of the type presented in A. Huxley’s 
«Brave New World» and George Orwell’s «1984», 
which is consistent with utilitarianism. People should 
not be controlled by powers over which they can ex­
ercise no control whatsoever. The means-ends 
utilitarian view of education is readily opposed and 
contrasted to the aim of liberal education towards an 
understanding of rational principles guiding judge-
43. R. F. Dearden. «Autonomy and Education» in Education 
and the Development of Reason, pp. 4M-4P4.
44. John Stuart Mill, p. 32.
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ment. A.C. MacIntyre in «Against Utilitarianism» is 
arguing for liberal education as the means by which 
people learn to discriminate between their own de­
sires and the socially induced wants and tastes, 
through the development of critical ability and intel­
ligence.
The functional view of education is also inimical to 
the concept of liberal education, for it implies a man­
ipulatory attitude towards persons, in the sense that 
the educational system satisfies society’s needs for 
people to perform specific functions and to conform to
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